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Access	  to	  Justice:	  Is	  Legal	  Services	  Regulation	  Blocking	  the	  Path?	  	  By	  Noel	  Semple1	  SSHRC	  Postdoctoral	  Fellow.	  Centre	  for	  the	  Legal	  Profession,	  	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Faculty	  of	  Law.	  	  
1.	  North	  America's	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Problem	  Access	  to	  justice	  requires,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  expert	  legal	  services	  be	  reasonably	  available	  to	  individuals	  of	  modest	  means	  who	  have	  legal	  needs.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States	  and	  in	  Canada,	  the	  inaccessibility	  of	  legal	  services	  has	  been	  widely	  recognized	  (Legal	  Services	  Corporation,	  2009;	  CBA	  A2J	  Committee,	  2013).	  	  The	  swelling	  tide	  of	  unrepresented	  litigants	  in	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  is	  one	  clear	  manifestation	  of	  this	  problem	  (Rigertas,	  2012;	  Choudhry	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	  However	  there	  are	  also	  widespread	  ummet	  needs	  for	  non-­‐dispute-­‐related	  legal	  services	  such	  as	  advice	  about	  mortgage	  transactions	  (Hadfield,	  2010).	  	  Not	  everyone	  who	  has	  a	  legal	  need	  wants	  or	  would	  benefit	  from	  expert	  legal	  services	  (Kritzer,	  2010).	  	  However	  in	  many	  cases	  going	  without	  them	  has	  seriously	  negative	  effects,	  which	  often	  extend	  beyond	  the	  individual	  experiencing	  the	  need	  (Albiston	  and	  Sandefur,	  2013,	  p.	  111).	  	  Public	  funding	  for	  legal	  aid	  is	  stagnant	  or	  shrinking	  in	  most	  parts	  of	  North	  America	  (Buckley,	  2010;	  Barnett,	  2012).	  This	  adds	  urgency	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  private	  sector	  legal	  services	  might	  be	  made	  more	  accessible.	  
	   Why	  would	  a	  person	  with	  a	  legal	  need	  go	  without	  expert	  legal	  services?	  	  The	  financial	  reasons	  might	  include	  her	  estimate	  of	  the	  total	  eventual	  cost	  of	  the	  service,	  as	  well	  as	  "cost	  structure"	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  requirement	  to	  produce	  a	  cash	  retainer	  and	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  final	  bill.	  	  Simple	  transactional	  legal	  services	  seem	  to	  be	  relatively	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affordable	  in	  North	  America	  (Sandefur	  2012),	  but	  hiring	  a	  lawyer	  for	  litigation	  can	  quickly	  become	  cost-­‐prohibitive	  for	  any	  middle-­‐or	  low-­‐income	  individual	  (Todd,	  2012;	  MacFarlane,	  2013).	  
However	  “money	  isn’t	  everything”	  in	  individuals'	  decisions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pay	  for	  help	  (Sandefur,	  2012).	  	  Research	  shows	  that	  the	  most	  important	  variable	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  person	  gets	  expert	  help	  for	  a	  legal	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  person’s	  income,	  but	  rather	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  (Pleasence	  and	  Balmer,	  2010;	  Baxter	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  This	  is	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  inconsistent	  legal	  consciousness	  (Sandefur,	  2012).	  Many	  people	  do	  not	  perceive	  the	  legal	  dimensions	  of	  their	  life	  problems	  and	  experiences,	  or	  the	  value	  of	  legal	  services	  in	  responding	  to	  them	  (Susskind,	  2008).	  	  Some	  people	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  hire	  lawyers	  do	  not	  do	  so;	  others	  who	  might	  borrow	  or	  deplete	  savings	  in	  order	  to	  afford	  medical	  or	  other	  services	  will	  not	  do	  so	  for	  legal	  services	  (Myrick	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Negative	  perceptions	  of	  either	  the	  value	  of	  the	  service,	  or	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  service	  provider	  may	  deter	  people.	  	  There	  are	  some	  who	  would	  be	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  pay	  for	  legal	  services,	  but	  do	  not	  find	  the	  variety	  of	  consumer	  legal	  services	  currently	  available	  in	  North	  America	  to	  be	  appealing.	  	  	  	  
Justice	  is	  less	  accessible	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  than	  it	  is	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  developed	  common	  law	  world,	  at	  least	  according	  to	  some	  measures	  (Hadfield,	  2010;	  Agrast	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  This	  article	  suggests	  one	  reason	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case:	  North	  American	  legal	  services	  regulation	  is	  exacerbating	  the	  access	  to	  justice	  problem.	  	  Previous	  scholarship	  has	  identified	  accessibility	  ramifications	  of	  various	  aspects	  of	  American	  regulation	  (Luban,	  1988;	  Rhode,	  1996;	  Abel,	  2011;	  Hadfield,	  2012).	  This	  article	  focuses	  on	  two	  distinctive	  features	  which	  unite	  American	  and	  Canadian	  regulatory	  regimes	  and	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distinguish	  them	  from	  those	  of	  other	  developed	  common	  law	  countries.	  	  	  First,	  North	  American	  regulators	  seek	  to	  preserve	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  through	  universal	  
licensure,	  while	  other	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  now	  license	  multiple	  legal	  occupations	  such	  as	  solicitors,	  barristers,	  and	  conveyancers.	  Second,	  North	  American	  regulators	  seek	  to	  
insulate	  lawyers	  by	  forbidding	  non-­‐lawyer	  firm	  ownership	  and	  management.	  This	  policy	  has	  gradually	  been	  abandoned	  in	  recent	  decades	  by	  regulators	  in	  England	  &	  Wales	  and	  Australia	  (and,	  to	  a	  more	  modest	  extent,	  their	  smaller	  common	  law	  neighbours).	  The	  article	  concludes	  that,	  while	  regulatory	  reform	  would	  not	  be	  a	  silver	  bullet	  for	  access,	  North	  American	  legal	  services	  regulators	  should	  understand	  and	  work	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  their	  policies	  on	  accessibility.	  
2.	  Universal	  Licensure	  and	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Occupational	  licensing	  forbids	  anyone	  who	  has	  not	  been	  granted	  a	  license	  from	  doing	  certain	  work.	  	  Economists	  argue	  that	  licensing	  reduces	  competition	  and	  increases	  price	  by	  restricting	  the	  supply	  of	  services	  (Friedman	  and	  Kuznets,	  1954;	  Pagliero,	  2010).	  	  	  Legal	  services	  licensing	  regimes	  are	  also	  often	  inaccurate	  predictors	  of	  service	  quality	  (Kritzer,	  1998;	  	  Moorhead,	  Sherr	  and	  Paterson	  2003).	  Critics	  have	  therefore	  called	  for	  legal	  services	  licensing	  barriers	  to	  be	  either	  abolished	  (Winston	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  lowered	  (Barton,	  2001),	  or	  reserved	  for	  a	  smaller	  portion	  of	  the	  legal	  services	  marketplace	  (Abel,	  2009).	  	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  among	  policy-­‐makers	  that	  licensing	  is	  a	  necessary	  prophylactic	  to	  prevent	  incompetent	  and	  fraudulent	  practice,	  the	  dire	  consequences	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  fully	  corrected	  after	  the	  fact	  by	  other	  interventions	  (Barton,	  2011).	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2.1	  The	  Economic	  Critique	  of	  Universal	  Licensure	  	  However,	  North	  America	  is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  common	  law	  regions	  by	  the	  
universalist	  nature	  of	  its	  licensing	  regimes.	  	  With	  a	  few	  small	  exceptions,1	  in	  these	  jurisdictions	  the	  only	  licensed	  category	  of	  provider	  is	  "lawyer,"	  all	  lawyers	  must	  surmount	  the	  same	  licensing	  barriers,	  and	  all	  lawyers	  are	  licensed	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  services	  (Wilkins,	  1993;	  Peppet,	  2005).	  
The	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  by	  contrast,	  have	  less	  onerous	  forms	  of	  licensing	  in	  the	  legal	  services	  sector.	  	  In	  England	  &	  Wales,	  the	  mere	  offering	  of	  legal	  advice,	  without	  preparing	  documents	  or	  appearing	  in	  court,	  does	  not	  require	  a	  license	  (Legal	  Services	  Act	  2007,	  	  	  s.	  12).	  This	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  accessible	  service	  models	  which	  are	  impossible	  in	  North	  America,	  such	  as	  Citizens'	  Advice	  Bureaux	  (Trebilcock,	  2008).	  
Although	  most	  legal	  services	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  are	  provided	  by	  licensed	  professionals,	  	  these	  countries	  issue	  different	  types	  of	  legal	  license	  granting	  practitioners	  different	  scopes	  of	  practice.	  This	  multiple	  licensing	  approach	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  way	  to	  mitigate	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	  effects	  of	  licensing	  in	  the	  legal	  services	  sector	  (Parker,	  1999;	  Brockman,	  2010;	  Albiston	  and	  Sandefur,	  2013),	  without	  abandoning	  licensing's	  prophylactic	  quality	  guarantee.	  Multiple	  licensing	  is	  meant	  to	  foster	  competitive	  regulation,	  wherein	  self-­‐regulatory	  legal	  occupations	  compete	  with	  each	  other.	  In	  addition	  to	  competing	  for	  clients	  (Shaked	  and	  Sutton,	  1981),	  they	  are	  also	  supposed	  to	  compete	  to	  attract	  practitioners	  to	  their	  ranks,	  and	  compete	  to	  convince	  the	  state	  to	  expand	  their	  spheres	  of	  jurisdiction	  (OECD,	  2007;	  Stephen,	  2013).	  	  Regulatory	  competition	  can	  foster	  access	  to	  justice	  by	  rationalizing	  barriers	  to	  entry	  and	  disciplining	  their	  unwarranted	  elevation	  by	  rent-­‐seeking	  self-­‐regulators.	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Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  established	  practitioners	  who	  control	  England's	  self-­‐regulatory	  Council	  for	  Licensed	  Conveyancers	  are	  tempted	  to	  increase	  the	  difficulty	  of	  their	  entrance	  exam	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  competition	  from	  new	  entrants.	  Competitive	  regulation	  can	  discipline	  this	  rent-­‐seeking	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  applicants	  deterred	  by	  the	  higher	  barrier	  to	  entry	  may	  choose	  to	  become	  solicitors	  instead,	  and	  thereby	  compete	  with	  conveyancers.	  	  Second,	  as	  the	  quantity	  of	  conveyancers	  is	  constrained	  and	  prices	  increase,	  their	  jurisdiction	  becomes	  increasingly	  tempting	  to	  other	  occupational	  groups.	  These	  other	  groups	  may	  be	  incentivized	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Board	  to	  expand	  into	  conveyancing	  services	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  the	  high	  profits.	  	  Conversely,	  if	  the	  conveyancers	  roll	  back	  their	  entry	  barriers	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  their	  licensees	  are	  incompetent	  to	  provide	  the	  service	  promised,	  then	  their	  reputation	  will	  suffer	  and	  consumers	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  alternatives.	  As	  the	  argument	  runs,	  the	  combination	  of	  multiple	  licensing	  and	  regulatory	  competition	  will	  rationalize	  entry	  barriers	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  public	  interest,	  impeding	  access	  to	  justice	  no	  more	  than	  is	  strictly	  necessary	  to	  protect	  quality	  (OECD,	  2007;	  Stephen,	  2013,	  Ch.	  7.).	  It	  will	  mitigate	  the	  price-­‐inflating	  effects	  of	  occupational	  licensure,	  and	  foreclose	  the	  possibility	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  rent-­‐seeking.	  	  
2.2	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Universal	  Licensing	  Critique	  The	  economic	  critique	  of	  universalist	  licensure	  offers	  a	  convincing	  account	  of	  how	  legal	  services	  regulation	  may	  be	  impeding	  access	  to	  justice	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.	  	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  occupational	  groups	  do	  not	  invariably	  compete	  aggressively	  to	  seize	  jurisdiction	  from	  each	  other.	  	  One	  group	  may	  be	  co-­‐opted	  by	  another	  (Coy	  and	  Hedeen,	  2005),	  or	  they	  may	  reach	  accommodations	  to	  avoid	  cut-­‐throat	  competition	  (OECD,	  2007).	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  what	  happened	  in	  England	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after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  conveyancer	  profession	  in	  1987	  (Kerridge	  and	  Davis,	  1999;	  Webb,	  2008),	  and	  after	  the	  extension	  of	  advocacy	  rights	  to	  solicitors	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Kerridge	  and	  Davis,	  1999;	  Boon	  and	  Flood,	  1999).	  	  	  
One	  possible	  access	  to	  justice	  drawback	  of	  multiple	  licensing	  is	  its	  complexity	  and	  attendant	  compliance	  costs	  for	  practitioners.	  	  	  Law	  firms	  (and	  therefore	  their	  clients)	  must	  pay	  the	  cost	  of	  running	  the	  front-­‐line	  regulators,	  the	  meso-­‐regulator,	  and	  adjunct	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  in	  England	  &	  Wales	  ((Legal	  Services	  Board	  (England	  &	  Wales),	  2012,	  p.	  10).	  	  Multiple	  licensing	  is	  a	  major	  reason	  why	  there	  are	  55	  different	  legal	  services	  regulators	  in	  Australia	  (Mortensen,	  2013,	  p.	  221).	  	  Universal	  licensing	  is	  comparatively	  straightforward,	  and	  this	  element	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  business	  is	  presumably	  lower	  for	  North	  American	  firms.	  
3.	  Insulation	  of	  Law	  Firms	  and	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Insulation	  of	  lawyers	  from	  non-­‐lawyer	  influence	  is	  another	  distinctive	  and	  potentially	  access-­‐impeding	  feature	  of	  North	  American	  legal	  services	  regulation.	  	  Only	  licensed	  lawyers	  may	  own	  or	  manage	  law	  firms,	  and	  lawyers	  are	  generally	  forbidden	  to	  enter	  fee-­‐sharing	  or	  other	  arrangements	  which	  would	  subject	  their	  professional	  judgment	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  non-­‐lawyers	  (Paton,	  2010;	  Hadfield,	  2012;	  Moliterno,	  2013).	  North	  American	  insulating	  rules	  include	  those	  prohibiting	  and	  tightly	  controlling	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  practice	  (MDP)	  and	  alternative	  business	  structures	  (e.g.	  ABA	  Model	  Rules	  of	  Professional	  Conduct,	  R.	  5.4(d)(1);	  Law	  Society	  Act	  (Ontario)	  ,	  s.	  61.0.1(4)).	  	  	  
In	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  by	  contrast,	  legal	  services	  regulators	  have	  mostly	  abandoned	  insulating	  rules.	  	  Could	  American	  and	  Canadian	  regulators	  improve	  the	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accessibility	  of	  justice	  by	  following	  the	  same	  path	  (Knake,	  2012;	  Hadfield,	  2012)?	  	  There	  are	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  insulating	  rules	  plausibly	  impede	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice:	  (i)	  by	  increasing	  the	  price	  of	  capital,	  (ii)	  by	  impeding	  the	  emergence	  of	  large	  consumer	  law	  firms,	  and	  (iii)	  by	  precluding	  potentially	  access-­‐enhancing	  inter-­‐professional	  collaborations.	  
3.1	  Insulating	  Regulation	  Increases	  the	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  	  Although	  not	  as	  capital-­‐intensive	  as	  some	  ventures,	  law	  firms	  do	  require	  capital,	  for	  example	  to	  purchase	  technology	  and	  fund	  accounts	  receivable	  (Bishop,	  1989;	  Dzienkowski	  and	  Peroni,	  2000).	  Most	  businesses	  can	  choose	  between	  a	  variety	  of	  capital	  sources,	  and	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  choose	  the	  mixture	  which	  meets	  their	  needs	  at	  the	  lowest	  possible	  cost	  (Miller,	  1996).	  	  However	  North	  American	  law	  firms	  are	  restricted	  by	  insulating	  regulation	  to	  two	  sources	  of	  capital:	  bank	  loans	  and	  licensed	  lawyers.	  	  This	  restriction	  on	  supply	  presumably	  increases	  the	  price	  which	  they	  must	  pay	  for	  capital.	  	  Banks,	  for	  example,	  might	  not	  offer	  their	  lowest	  interest	  rates	  to	  law	  firms,	  because	  they	  are	  not	  required	  to	  compete	  with	  venture	  capitalists	  and	  investment	  bankers	  to	  capture	  this	  business.	  	  
Like	  other	  costs	  of	  doing	  business,	  the	  increased	  cost	  of	  capital	  is	  presumably	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers,	  thereby	  raising	  prices	  and	  exacerbating	  the	  financial	  impediments	  to	  accessibility.	  	  	  An	  oft-­‐cited	  rule	  of	  thumb	  is	  that,	  in	  exchange	  for	  investing	  in	  an	  American	  law	  firm,	  partners	  can	  expect	  to	  retain	  as	  profit	  at	  least	  33%	  on	  every	  hour	  billed	  by	  the	  associates	  (Samuelson	  and	  Jaffe,	  1990;	  Goldberg,	  2009).	  	  Non-­‐lawyer	  investors	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  undercut	  this	  healthy	  margin	  if	  allowed	  by	  regulation	  (Gillers,	  1985).	  	  
	   One	  reason	  why	  partners	  demand	  high	  returns	  for	  capital	  left	  in	  the	  firm	  is	  that	  they	  are	  usually	  highly	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  firm	  failing	  of	  faltering.	  	  The	  safe	  course	  for	  a	  law	  firm	  partner	  is	  to	  diversify	  –	  maximize	  draws	  on	  firm	  profits	  and	  invest	  them	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elsewhere,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  excessive	  exposure	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  firm.	  	  Thus,	  firms	  which	  retain	  earnings	  to	  fund	  expansion	  or	  innovation	  risk	  losing	  their	  partners	  (Hadfield,	  2008;	  Campbell,	  2012).	  
Public	  equity	  financing	  –	  which	  Australia	  permits	  for	  law	  firms–	  facilitates	  capital	  placement	  with	  very	  low	  transaction	  costs	  (Miller,	  1996,	  p.	  98;).	  It	  also	  makes	  it	  easy	  for	  investors	  to	  diversify,	  which	  encourages	  them	  to	  accept	  risk	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  (Hadfield,	  2008;	  Iacobucci	  &	  Trebilcock	  2014).	  In	  principle,	  equity	  market	  financing	  could	  facilitate	  the	  emergence	  of	  more	  innovative	  and	  accessible	  consumer	  law	  firms.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  an	  entrepreneurial	  American	  lawyer	  wishes	  to	  start	  an	  unconventional	  law	  firm	  which	  will	  use	  technology,	  consumer	  branding,	  and	  legal	  process	  outsourcing	  to	  offer	  fixed-­‐fee	  litigation	  services	  to	  middle-­‐income	  individuals.	  	  This	  lawyer	  is	  looking	  for	  venture	  capital,	  but	  balks	  at	  the	  high	  interest	  rate	  quoted	  by	  the	  bank.	  	  She	  can	  form	  a	  partnership	  with	  another	  lawyer	  who	  has	  money	  to	  invest,	  but	  this	  would	  be	  a	  risky	  proposition	  for	  that	  second	  lawyer.	  	  Becoming	  a	  partner	  in	  a	  law	  firm	  requires	  a	  very	  substantial	  commitment	  of	  financial	  and	  human	  capital.	  	  The	  investment	  being	  proposed	  is	  far	  from	  a	  sure	  bet.	  
	  By	  contrast,	  an	  initial	  public	  offering	  on	  a	  stock	  exchange	  would	  allow	  millions	  of	  investors	  to	  share	  in	  the	  potentially	  high	  rewards	  of	  this	  innovative	  venture,	  while	  bearing	  only	  a	  small	  risk.	  	  Thus,	  the	  restrictions	  on	  capital	  supply	  not	  only	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  business,	  but	  may	  also	  render	  the	  very	  types	  of	  capital-­‐intensive	  innovation	  which	  would	  increase	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  As	  Gillian	  Hadfield	  puts	  the	  point,	  	  "innovation	  in	  legal	  markets	  is	  …	  severely	  hampered	  by	  limitations	  on	  the	  capacity	  for	  innovators…	  to	  finance	  their	  entrepreneurial	  efforts"	  (Hadfield,	  2008,	  p.	  139).	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3.2	  Insulating	  Regulation	  Keeps	  Firms	  Small	  North	  America's	  insulation	  of	  lawyers	  from	  non-­‐lawyers	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  suppressing	  the	  emergence	  of	  larger	  firms,	  which	  in	  turn	  impedes	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  Private-­‐sector	  legal	  services	  for	  North	  American	  individuals	  (as	  opposed	  to	  corporations	  and	  institutions)	  are	  predominantly	  provided	  by	  lawyers	  working	  alone	  or	  in	  small	  firms	  (Heinz	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  In	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  by	  contrast,	  there	  are	  now	  examples	  of	  large,	  consumer-­‐focused	  law	  firms.	  The	  new	  English	  firm	  Co-­‐Operative	  Legal	  Services,	  which	  provides	  services	  exclusively	  to	  individuals,	  plans	  to	  grow	  to	  3000	  lawyers	  by	  2017	  (Robins,	  2012).	  Australia's	  Slater	  &	  Gordon,	  a	  publicly-­‐traded	  corporation	  providing	  individual-­‐client	  legal	  services,	  employs	  1350	  staff	  in	  69	  locations	  (Slater	  &	  Gordon,	  2012).	  Both	  of	  these	  firms	  are	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  largest	  North	  American	  consumer	  law	  firms,	  which	  have	  less	  than	  100	  lawyers.2	  	  	  	  Both	  Co-­‐Operative	  Legal	  and	  Slater	  &	  Gordon	  serve	  individual	  clients	  almost	  exclusively.	  	  Both	  firms	  serve	  the	  civil	  legal	  needs	  most	  commonly	  experienced,	  such	  as	  conveyancing,	  family	  law,	  estate	  law,	  and	  plaintiff-­‐side	  personal	  injury	  matters.	  	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  both	  of	  these	  firms	  have	  non-­‐lawyer	  ownership,	  which	  is	  illegal	  in	  North	  America.	  	  	  Insulating	  regulation	  impedes	  the	  emergence	  of	  large,	  capital-­‐intensive	  consumer	  law	  firms,	  by	  restricting	  their	  access	  to	  capital	  (OECD,	  2007).	  	  
3.2.1	  Economies	  of	  Scope	  Why	  might	  bigger	  firms	  offer	  more	  accessible	  legal	  services?	  	  The	  access-­‐enhancing	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  large	  firms	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  categories:	  economies	  of	  scope,	  risk-­‐spreading,	  and	  economies	  of	  scale.	  	  Economies	  of	  scope	  exist	  when	  a	  single	  firm	  can	  produce	  a	  set	  of	  different	  outputs	  more	  efficiently	  than	  multiple	  firms	  can	  (Teece,	  1980).	  A	  large	  law	  firm	  might	  achieve	  economies	  of	  scope	  by	  providing	  services	  in	  multiple	  consumer	  legal	  areas,	  e.g.	  family	  law,	  estate	  law,	  and	  real	  estate.	  	  	  An	  individual	  is	  likely	  to	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have	  legal	  needs	  in	  several	  of	  these	  areas	  over	  time,	  and	  (s)he	  can	  be	  more	  efficiently	  and	  cost-­‐effectively	  served	  by	  a	  firm	  which	  has	  a	  file	  on	  the	  client	  with	  information	  from	  past	  retainers.	   	  
A	  sole	  practitioner	  or	  small	  firm	  can	  capture	  economies	  of	  scope	  by	  being	  a	  generalist,	  working	  in	  multiple	  practice	  areas.	  	  However	  generalism	  in	  a	  solo	  practice	  or	  small	  firm	  comes	  at	  price—the	  firm	  loses	  the	  specialization	  benefits	  achieved	  by	  working	  consistently	  in	  a	  given	  field	  (Moorhead,	  2010;	  Stephen,	  2013,	  Ch.	  8).	  The	  larger	  a	  firm	  is,	  the	  more	  readily	  it	  can	  simultaneously	  capture	  both	  economies	  of	  scope	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  specialization,	  by	  including	  specialists	  in	  multiple	  areas	  (Stephen	  and	  Melville,	  2008).	  The	  attendant	  economies	  of	  scope	  should	  permit	  lower	  prices	  for	  repeat	  clients,	  and	  the	  specialization	  should	  foster	  better	  quality	  service.	  
3.2.2	  Risk	  Spreading	  and	  Flat	  Rate	  Services	  	  Larger	  firms	  also	  have	  greater	  potential	  to	  spread	  risk,	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  lower	  prices	  and	  more	  accessible	  services	  (OECD,	  2007).	  Having	  multiple	  practice	  areas	  mitigates	  the	  effects	  of	  business	  cycles	  on	  each	  of	  them	  (Gilson	  and	  Mnookin,	  1985;	  Stephen,	  2013).	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  firm's	  personal	  insolvency	  practice	  suffers	  during	  an	  economic	  boom,	  then	  real	  estate	  transactions	  may	  compensate.	  A	  firm	  enjoying	  this	  form	  of	  stability	  can	  achieve	  consistent	  profitability	  at	  lower	  price	  points.	  
Risk-­‐spreading	  is	  also	  the	  reason	  why	  larger	  firms	  are	  better	  positioned	  to	  offer	  fixed	  fee	  (flat-­‐rate)	  legal	  services	  for	  contested	  matters,	  which	  have	  significant	  access	  to	  justice	  benefits.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century,	  hourly	  billing	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	  business	  model	  for	  North	  American	  lawyers	  handling	  contested	  matters,	  with	  the	  exception	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of	  certain	  tort	  claims	  where	  contingency	  fees	  predominate	  (Brockman,	  2004;	  Woolley,	  2004;	  Fortney,	  2005).	  
The	  access	  to	  justice	  problem	  with	  hourly	  billing	  is	  the	  financial	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  which	  it	  requires	  clients	  to	  bear.	  	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  difficult	  for	  a	  person	  of	  modest	  means	  to	  commit	  to	  paying	  $10,000	  for	  representation	  in	  a	  contested	  divorce,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  make	  that	  commitment	  if	  that	  person	  is	  told	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  legal	  service	  could	  cost	  as	  much	  as	  $20,000.	  	  Fixed	  fees	  make	  legal	  services	  more	  accessible	  because	  they	  clearly	  limit	  the	  client's	  financial	  exposure	  to	  the	  firm.	  Even	  if	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  a	  legal	  service	  is	  the	  same	  under	  the	  fixed	  fee	  model	  as	  it	  would	  be	  under	  hourly	  billing,	  removing	  the	  risk	  makes	  the	  service	  easier	  to	  afford.	  	  	  According	  to	  a	  recent	  UK	  survey,	  87%	  of	  those	  who	  paid	  for	  legal	  services	  via	  fixed	  fee	  were	  satisfied	  with	  the	  service,	  compared	  to	  73%	  of	  those	  who	  paid	  an	  hourly	  rate	  ( Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  (UK),	  2013).	  	  	  
Why,	  then,	  don't	  North	  America's	  consumer	  law	  firms	  offer	  fixed	  fee	  services	  in	  contested	  matters?	  	  In	  small	  firms,	  the	  dominance	  of	  hourly	  billing	  reflects	  the	  difficulty	  of	  predicting	  how	  much	  work	  a	  retainer	  in	  a	  contested	  matter	  will	  require.	  Ray	  Worthy	  Campbell	  identifies	  the	  "runaway	  engagement"	  risk,	  which	  can	  lurk	  in	  even	  apparently	  straightforward	  cases,	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  flat	  rate	  billing	  (2012,	  p.	  59).	  	  Indeed,	  the	  cases	  which	  make	  it	  to	  the	  top-­‐level	  appellate	  courts	  after	  thousands	  of	  hours	  of	  lawyer	  labour	  often	  have	  nothing	  initially	  apparent	  in	  their	  facts	  to	  distinguish	  them	  from	  numerous	  other	  cases	  which	  settle	  quickly.	  	  Even	  setting	  aside	  the	  extreme	  runaway	  engagements,	  there	  may	  be	  significant	  variance	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  time	  necessary	  to	  resolve	  the	  garden	  variety	  cases	  which	  come	  into	  a	  personal	  injury	  or	  family	  law	  firm.	  A	  solo	  practitioner	  who	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handles	  200	  divorce	  files	  may	  not	  have	  enough	  data	  to	  reliably	  predict	  how	  much	  time	  cases	  will	  require.	  	  She	  thus	  perceives	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  bill	  by	  the	  hour.	  
Larger	  firms	  can	  more	  readily	  quantify	  and	  accept	  the	  risk	  of	  unpredictable	  labour	  requirements	  in	  contested	  cases,	  and	  they	  are	  therefore	  better	  positioned	  to	  offer	  flat	  rate	  services.	  	  	  A	  large	  firm	  which	  handles	  10,000	  divorce	  files	  in	  a	  year	  can	  learn	  to	  predict	  the	  labour	  inputs	  necessary	  to	  resolve	  cases,	  and	  identify	  the	  attributes	  which	  make	  a	  case	  more	  or	  less	  labour-­‐intensive	  to	  resolve.	  	  Using	  this	  data,	  the	  firm	  should	  be	  able	  to	  quote	  fixed	  fees	  which	  allow	  it	  to	  remain	  consistently	  profitable.	  
As	  predicted	  by	  this	  analysis,	  flat	  rate	  consumer	  legal	  services	  for	  contested	  matters	  are	  now	  being	  offered	  by	  large,	  well-­‐capitalized	  firms	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  	  The	  Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  recently	  reported	  that	  42%	  of	  consumer	  legal	  services	  delivered	  in	  England	  &	  Wales	  are	  now	  paid	  for	  with	  fixed	  fees	  ( Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  (UK),	  2013).	  	  Co-­‐operative	  Legal	  Services	  offers	  telephone	  consultation	  about	  family	  law	  matters	  for	  £175,	  and	  will	  review	  court	  documents	  for	  £50	  (Rose,	  2013;	  Bindman,	  2013).	  Australia's	  Slater	  &	  Gordon	  also	  offers	  fixed	  fees	  in	  family	  law,	  which	  the	  lawyers	  quote	  to	  the	  clients	  at	  the	  outset	  after	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  case	  (Slater	  &	  Gordon,	  2013).	  	  	  
3.2.3	  Economies	  of	  Scale	  Economies	  of	  scale	  are	  the	  third	  reason	  why	  bigger	  firms	  might	  be	  more	  accessible	  (Knake,	  2012).	  Economies	  of	  scale	  are	  reductions	  in	  the	  average	  costs	  of	  producing	  outputs	  which	  occur	  as	  the	  scale	  of	  production	  increases	  (Pratten,	  2005).	  For	  example,	  the	  cost	  of	  bringing	  specialized	  expertise	  to	  bear	  on	  each	  file	  decreases	  as	  a	  firm	  grows.	  As	  noted	  above,	  a	  large	  firm	  practicing	  in	  multiple	  areas	  can	  have	  specialists	  in	  each,	  so	  that	  each	  lawyer	  spends	  less	  of	  his	  or	  her	  time	  maintaining	  legal	  expertise	  in	  multiple	  areas	  and	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more	  time	  serving	  clients.	  	  If	  the	  firm's	  work	  practices	  are	  sufficiently	  collaborative,	  then	  knowledge	  can	  also	  be	  efficiently	  shared	  within	  its	  walls	  (Hadfield,	  2000)	  which	  further	  reduces	  the	  cost	  of	  applying	  expertise	  to	  a	  file.	  	  	  
Scale	  can	  also	  reduce	  labour	  costs	  by	  allowing	  workers	  to	  be	  deployed	  more	  efficiently	  (Heinz	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  A	  sole	  practitioner	  might	  need	  an	  administrative	  assistant	  to	  work	  four	  days	  per	  week.	  However,	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  hire	  someone	  on	  these	  terms,	  (s)he	  may	  be	  obliged	  to	  make	  do	  with	  a	  full-­‐time	  assistant	  or	  a	  ½	  time	  assistant	  (Gilson	  and	  Mnookin,	  1985).	  With	  a	  full-­‐time	  assistant	  the	  lawyer	  will	  waste	  labour	  costs;	  with	  a	  ½	  time	  assistant	  the	  lawyer	  must	  perform	  some	  administrative	  tasks	  herself	  (which	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  her	  skills).	  	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  mismatch	  will	  increase	  the	  lawyer's	  overhead	  and	  therefore	  the	  cost	  of	  services.	  	  	  
Large	  firms	  might	  also	  be	  better	  positioned	  to	  economize	  on	  relatively	  expensive	  lawyer	  labour	  by	  substituting	  less-­‐expensive	  non-­‐lawyer	  labour.	  	  For	  example,	  Frank	  Stephen	  (2013)	  suggests	  that	  they	  might	  assign	  non-­‐lawyers	  to	  gather	  information	  from	  clients	  and	  direct	  legal	  inquiries	  to	  specialists	  in	  a	  head	  office.	  	  Stephen	  cites	  data	  from	  Australia	  showing	  that	  incorporated	  legal	  practices	  (ILPs)	  have	  significantly	  more	  paralegal	  employees	  per	  lawyer	  employee	  than	  do	  traditional	  partnership	  firms	  and	  sole	  proprietorships.	  They	  also	  have	  higher	  operating	  profit	  margins	  –	  33.8%	  in	  ILPs	  and	  26.2%	  in	  unincorporated	  firms	  (Stephen,	  2013,	  p.	  136).	  If	  this	  form	  of	  business	  organization	  produces	  higher	  profit	  margins	  due	  to	  greater	  efficiency,	  then	  competition	  should	  eventually	  pass	  those	  benefits	  on	  to	  consumers	  through	  lower	  prices.	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To	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  legal	  service	  is	  simply	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  a	  lawyer's	  time,	  economies	  of	  scale	  will	  be	  relatively	  modest	  (Hadfield,	  2008).	  However	  technological	  progress	  is	  creating	  opportunities	  for	  consumer	  law	  firms	  to	  make	  investments	  which	  enhance	  access	  and	  profit,	  if	  the	  firms	  are	  large	  enough	  to	  recoup	  these	  fixed	  costs.	  	  Gillian	  Hadfield's	  work	  suggests	  that	  the	  predominance	  of	  expert	  lawyer	  labour	  in	  producing	  legal	  products	  and	  services	  is	  an	  artefact	  of	  20th	  century	  technology	  and	  regulation.	  	  She	  predicts	  a	  new,	  more	  accessible	  market,	  in	  which	  "human	  capital	  is	  transformed	  into	  concrete	  forms	  such	  as	  documents,	  processes,	  organizations,	  and	  procedures"	  (Hadfield,	  2008,	  p.	  137).	  	  In	  such	  a	  market,	  Hadfield	  argues,	  regulatory	  impediments	  to	  firm	  growth	  are	  a	  major	  roadblock	  to	  access-­‐enhancing	  innovations.	  
Access-­‐enhancing	  information	  technology	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  significant	  economies	  of	  scale.	  	  An	  interactive	  legal	  services	  website	  is	  expensive,	  but	  a	  firm	  would	  only	  have	  to	  build	  it	  once	  (Iacobucci	  &	  Trebilcock,	  2014).	  	  Also	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale	  are	  branding	  and	  marketing	  efforts,	  which	  can	  reduce	  clients'	  "search	  costs"	  –	  the	  work	  involved	  in	  identifying	  a	  legal	  service	  provider	  which	  can	  meet	  one's	  needs	  (Hadfield,	  2012;	  Stephen	  2013).	  Marketing	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  enhance	  legal	  consciousness,	  which	  was	  identified	  above	  as	  a	  significant	  contributor	  to	  the	  access	  to	  justice	  problem.	  Large	  consumer	  firms	  might	  be	  able	  to	  deploy	  niche	  marketing	  campaigns	  to	  reach	  marginalized	  groups	  who	  have	  their	  legal	  rights	  violated	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  such	  as	  isolated	  senior	  citizens,	  agricultural	  labourers,	  and	  sex	  trade	  workers.	  	  
	  Another	  investment	  which	  is	  subject	  to	  significant	  economies	  of	  scale	  is	  research	  and	  development	  of	  accessible	  consumer	  legal	  services	  and	  products.	  	  Justice	  becomes	  more	  accessible	  when	  consumer	  law	  firms	  bring	  to	  market	  innovative	  legal	  products	  and	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services.	  	  To	  succeed,	  such	  initiatives	  must	  be	  informed	  by	  comprehensive	  market	  research	  about	  what	  average	  people	  actually	  want	  and	  are	  prepared	  to	  pay	  for	  (Hadfield,	  2012).	  	  As	  firm	  size	  increases,	  such	  efforts	  become	  more	  feasible	  and	  economical.	  
3.3	  Insulating	  Regulation	  Prevents	  Collaboration	  with	  Non-­‐Lawyers	  	  In	  addition	  to	  increasing	  the	  cost	  of	  capital	  and	  suppressing	  firm	  size,	  regulation	  arguably	  impedes	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  by	  foreclosing	  some	  forms	  of	  collaboration	  between	  lawyers	  and	  non-­‐lawyers.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  non-­‐lawyer	  capital	  from	  which	  North	  American	  law	  firms	  are	  insulated,	  but	  also	  non-­‐lawyer	  leadership	  and	  collaboration.	  	  Multi-­‐disciplinary	  practices,	  in	  which	  lawyers	  and	  non-­‐lawyers	  collaborate	  as	  equals,	  are	  regulated	  so	  tightly	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  that	  they	  are	  almost	  non-­‐existent	  (Love,	  2002	  at	  R.	  5.4(b);	  Paton,	  2010;	  Rappaport,	  2008).	  Nor	  are	  lawyers	  permitted	  to	  subject	  their	  professional	  judgment	  to	  any	  non-­‐lawyer	  other	  than	  a	  client	  (Love,	  2002,	  R.	  5.4(a)	  and	  R.	  5.4(d)(3);	  Law	  Society	  of	  British	  Columbia,	  2009	  at	  3.6.7;	  Law	  Society	  of	  Upper	  Canada,	  2000	  at	  R.	  2.08(8)).	  Even	  without	  becoming	  larger	  than	  they	  currently	  are,	  firms	  permitted	  to	  collaborate	  more	  intensively	  with	  non-­‐lawyers	  might	  innovate	  to	  enhance	  access	  (Susskind,	  2008).	  
3.3.1	  Economies	  of	  Scope,	  Risk-­‐Spreading,	  and	  Consumer	  Brands	  "One-­‐stop	  shopping"	  economies	  of	  scope	  are	  available	  from	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  practice.	  	  For	  example,	  an	  individual	  who	  is	  buying	  a	  home	  will	  often	  require	  the	  services	  of	  both	  a	  real	  estate	  agent	  and	  a	  lawyer.	  	  In	  North	  America's	  current	  regulatory	  environment,	  (s)he	  must	  search	  for,	  evaluate,	  retain,	  and	  instruct	  two	  independent	  firms	  to	  meet	  these	  needs	  (OECD,	  2007,	  p.	  49).	  	  Absent	  insulating	  regulation,	  integrated	  professional	  service	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firms	  can	  emerge	  offering	  package	  deals	  including	  both	  legal	  and	  other	  services	  (Director	  General	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (UK),	  2001;	  Dzienkowski	  and	  Peroni,	  2000).	  	  
Non-­‐legal	  retail	  and	  service	  companies	  have	  expertise	  which	  can	  help	  lawyers	  provide	  access	  to	  justice.	  Supermarket	  executives	  may	  not	  know	  anything	  about	  estates	  or	  divorces,	  but	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  robust	  procedures	  and	  institutional	  knowledge	  for	  human	  resources	  and	  marketing	  (Stephen,	  2013).	  Large	  retail	  firms	  also	  usually	  have	  strong	  consumer	  brands,	  and	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  long-­‐term	  investments	  without	  immediate	  profit	  (Knake,	  2012).	  A	  law	  firm	  looking	  to	  provide	  innovative	  access	  to	  justice	  solutions	  may	  need	  all	  of	  these	  things,	  and	  collaboration	  with	  the	  supermarket	  would	  offer	  ready	  access	  to	  them	  (Stephen,	  2013,	  Ch.	  8;	  Clementi,	  2004).	  Frank	  Stephen	  suggests	  that	  such	  collaborations	  may	  also	  improve	  legal	  service	  quality,	  insofar	  as	  the	  consumer	  brand	  will	  be	  motivated	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  services	  which	  would	  degrade	  its	  brand	  capital	  are	  provided	  under	  its	  name	  (Stephen,	  2013,	  Ch.	  8).	  	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  regulatory	  liberalization	  under	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Act	  2007	  has	  already	  produced	  initiatives	  along	  these	  lines,	  including	  Stobart	  Barrister	  and	  Bott	  Aviation.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  such	  collaborations	  produce	  more	  favourable	  rulings	  or	  settlement	  terms	  for	  clients,	  they	  may	  well	  improve	  the	  client's	  experience	  of	  interacting	  with	  the	  firm.	  	  Communication	  and	  "customer	  service"	  are	  common	  sources	  of	  client	  dissatisfaction	  with	  lawyers	  (e.g.	  MacFarlane,	  2013),	  and	  collaboration	  with	  non-­‐lawyers	  might	  help	  firms	  do	  better.	  	  	  
3.3.2	  Technology-­‐Enabled	  Accessible	  Services	  Non-­‐lawyer	  collaboration	  can	  also	  help	  lawyers	  produce	  more	  accessible	  and	  affordable	  legal	  products.	  	  Richard	  Susskind	  has	  argued	  that	  many	  legal	  services	  which	  are	  currently	  delivered	  through	  labour-­‐intensive	  "bespoke"	  lawyer	  efforts	  can	  be	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commoditized	  (Susskind,	  2008,	  p.	  29).	  	  Examples	  include	  form	  contracts	  and	  automated	  online	  dispute-­‐resolution	  services	  (Lodder	  and	  Zeleznikow,	  2005).	  	  Because	  they	  leverage	  legal	  expertise	  to	  serve	  many	  clients	  instead	  of	  only	  one	  at	  a	  time,	  these	  products	  or	  commodities	  are	  much	  cheaper	  than	  actually	  retaining	  a	  lawyer	  (Kobayashi	  and	  Ribstein,	  2011).	  	  Even	  if	  inferior	  to	  personalized	  assistance,	  such	  commodities	  might	  bring	  expert	  legal	  help	  to	  people	  who	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  a	  lawyer	  (Stephen,	  2013,	  Ch.	  8).	  	  
Taking	  advantage	  of	  such	  opportunities	  typically	  requires	  substantial	  non-­‐legal	  expertise,	  often	  in	  information	  technology	  fields	  (Campbell,	  2012;	  Kobayashi	  and	  Ribstein,	  2011).	  One	  example	  is	  quantitative	  legal	  prediction	  (QLP)	  (Hadfield,	  2008).	  QLP	  uses	  large	  databases	  of	  previously-­‐resolved	  cases	  to	  inductively	  predict	  likely	  outcomes	  from	  a	  given	  fact	  scenario	  (Katz,	  2013).	  	  Corporate	  clients	  are	  already	  benefitting	  from	  QLP	  (see	  e.g.	  McShane	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  but	  it	  could	  also	  enhance	  access	  to	  justice	  for	  individuals.	  	  	  
3.3.3	  Is	  Regulation	  Impeding	  Collaboration?	  Lawyer	  collaboration	  with	  non-­‐lawyers	  has	  significant	  potential	  to	  foster	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  today,	  but	  whether	  insulating	  regulation	  is	  actually	  preventing	  such	  collaboration	  may	  be	  contested.	  	  The	  regulatory	  status	  quo	  allows	  North	  American	  lawyers	  to	  collaborate	  with	  others	  by	  purchasing	  their	  services	  and	  products,	  or	  by	  employing	  and	  supervising	  them	  (Dzienkowski	  and	  Peroni,	  2000).	  	  However,	  North	  America's	  insulating	  regulation	  sharply	  limits	  the	  types	  of	  collaboration	  which	  are	  currently	  possible	  (Kobayashi	  and	  Ribstein,	  2011,	  p.	  1188).	  	  North	  American	  law	  firms	  may	  source	  non-­‐lawyer	  labour	  internally	  by	  employing	  and	  supervising	  non-­‐lawyers,	  but	  they	  cannot	  have	  non-­‐lawyers	  supervise	  lawyers.	  	  	  If	  non-­‐lawyers	  cannot	  collaborate	  with	  lawyers	  in	  their	  manner	  of	  choice,	  they	  may	  not	  collaborate	  at	  all	  or	  they	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  adopt	  less	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efficient	  and	  more	  costly	  "second-­‐best"	  alternatives	  for	  collaboration	  (Dzienkowski	  and	  Peroni,	  2000,	  p.	  120).	  	  Non-­‐lawyers	  whose	  skill	  sets	  have	  access-­‐enhancing	  potential	  might	  only	  be	  interested	  in	  collaborating	  with	  lawyers	  as	  venture	  capitalists,	  investors,	  or	  employers	  of	  lawyers.	  They	  might	  not	  be	  willing	  to	  work	  as	  employees	  of	  lawyers	  or	  independent	  contractors,	  given	  that	  these	  arrangements	  offer	  less	  control	  and	  less	  potential	  for	  profit	  to	  the	  non-­‐lawyer	  (Hadfield,	  2008).	  	  	  
While	  various	  forms	  of	  lawyer/non-­‐lawyer	  collaboration	  are	  possible	  under	  the	  regulatory	  status	  quo,	  "fully	  integrated"	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  practices	  are	  not	  (Dzienkowski	  and	  Peroni,	  2000,	  p.	  171).	  Full	  integration	  may	  not	  be	  necessary	  for	  large	  corporate	  clients	  to	  capture	  the	  benefits	  of	  collaboration,	  but	  Ray	  Worthy	  Campbell	  argues	  that	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  individual	  consumers	  of	  legal	  services.	  	  Corporations	  are	  at	  liberty	  to	  create	  inter-­‐professional	  collaborations	  among	  their	  own	  legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	  employees.	  They	  can	  also	  create	  collaborations	  by	  having	  their	  in-­‐house	  lawyers	  work	  with	  outside	  non-­‐lawyers,	  or	  by	  having	  their	  non-­‐lawyer	  executives	  work	  with	  outside	  lawyers.	  	  Individual	  clients	  do	  not	  have	  these	  options;	  if	  they	  are	  to	  benefit	  from	  collaboration	  it	  must	  come	  as	  an	  integrated	  package	  (Campbell,	  2012,	  p.	  33).	  
3.4	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Insulation	  Critique	  Rolling	  back	  insulating	  regulation	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  panacea	  for	  North	  America's	  access	  to	  justice	  problems.	  	  The	  prevalence	  of	  small	  firms	  in	  the	  consumer	  legal	  services	  marketplace	  is	  not	  entirely	  a	  function	  of	  legal	  services	  regulation.	  	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  insulating	  regulation	  has	  not	  prevented	  North	  American	  firms	  with	  corporate	  clientele	  from	  becoming	  much	  larger.	  	  One	  non-­‐regulatory	  impediment	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  nation-­‐wide	  consumer	  law	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  laws	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applicable	  to	  individuals'	  legal	  matters	  often	  vary	  significantly	  between	  the	  states	  and	  provinces	  of	  each	  country.	  
Nor	  should	  the	  extent	  of	  change	  in	  consumer	  legal	  services	  outside	  of	  North	  America	  be	  overstated.	  	  Despite	  the	  abolition	  of	  most	  insulating	  regulation,	  most	  consumer-­‐clientele	  firms	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  are	  still	  very	  small	  (Mark,	  2010;	  	  Stephen	  2013,	  Ch.	  8).	  	  Co-­‐Operative	  Legal	  Services	  has	  encountered	  significant	  headwinds,	  including	  a	  loss	  of	  £3.4m	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2013,	  multiple	  changes	  of	  leadership,	  and	  a	  potential	  for	  "contagion"	  from	  troubles	  at	  the	  bank	  which	  is	  the	  firm's	  corporate	  sibling	  (Legal	  Futures	  2013b;	  Solicitors	  Regulation	  Authority	  2013).	  	  Only	  three	  Australian	  law	  firms	  have	  taken	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  list	  on	  a	  stock	  exchange	  (Legal	  Futures,	  2013;	  Sheehy,	  2013).	  The	  actual	  value	  to	  consumers	  of	  the	  firm	  investments	  discussed	  above	  may	  also	  be	  questioned.	  	  For	  example,	  despite	  the	  emergence	  of	  technology-­‐enabled	  legal	  services	  in	  the	  UK,	  surveys	  continue	  to	  find	  that	  clients	  are	  most	  satisfied	  with	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  advice	  (Legal	  Services	  Consumer	  Panel	  (UK),	  2013).	  
Nevertheless,	  insulating	  regulation	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  very	  convincing	  access	  to	  justice	  critique.	  	  	  A	  strong	  theoretical	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  these	  strictures	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  capital	  and	  therefore	  prices.	  	  They	  also	  seem	  to	  keep	  firms	  small	  when	  bigger	  firms	  might	  be	  more	  accessible,	  and	  prevent	  innovative	  collaborations	  between	  lawyers	  and	  others.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  predict	  the	  size	  and	  shape	  of	  the	  innovations	  which	  might	  emerge	  in	  a	  liberalized	  North	  American	  market,	  but	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  they	  would	  make	  justice	  modestly	  more	  accessible.	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4.	  Conclusion	  Is	  legal	  services	  regulation	  impeding	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  in	  North	  America?	  	  Justice	  would	  be	  more	  accessible	  if	  expert	  legal	  services	  were	  cheaper	  and	  more	  variegated,	  and	  if	  people	  had	  more	  awareness	  of	  their	  own	  legal	  needs.	  	  Regulatory	  reform	  can	  bring	  about	  these	  results,	  according	  to	  scholars	  such	  as	  Gillian	  Hadfield	  and	  Frank	  Stephen.	  	  Universal	  lawyer	  licensing	  and	  insulation	  of	  law	  firms	  are	  elements	  which	  distinguish	  North	  American	  legal	  services	  regulation	  from	  other	  common	  law	  regimes,	  and	  this	  article	  has	  asked	  whether	  these	  features	  are	  impeding	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice.	  
The	  access	  to	  justice	  argument	  for	  regulatory	  liberalization	  is	  convincing.	  	  Multiple	  licensing	  and	  regulatory	  competition	  seem	  to	  promise	  mitigation	  of	  the	  anticompetitive	  effects	  of	  occupational	  licensing,	  without	  abandonment	  of	  its	  quality	  assurance.	  	  Opening	  law	  firms	  to	  non-­‐lawyer	  investment	  and	  leadership	  should	  reduce	  capital	  costs	  and	  therefore	  prices,	  allow	  the	  emergence	  of	  larger	  and	  more	  accessible	  consumer	  law	  firms,	  and	  facilitate	  innovative	  collaborations	  between	  lawyers	  and	  non-­‐lawyers.	  	  Co-­‐Operative	  Legal	  Services	  and	  Slater	  &	  Gordon,	  along	  with	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  innovative	  consumer	  law	  ventures,	  provide	  some	  indication	  of	  the	  success	  of	  this	  strategy	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  	  If	  access	  to	  justice	  is	  weaker	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  than	  it	  is	  in	  other	  developed	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  regulation	  seems	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  explanation.	  	  
Of	  course,	  access	  to	  justice	  is	  not	  the	  only	  relevant	  consideration	  in	  a	  normative	  analysis	  of	  legal	  services	  regulation.	  	  We	  do	  not	  regulate	  lawyers	  in	  order	  to	  make	  justice	  more	  accessible;	  we	  regulate	  lawyers	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  clients	  and	  third	  parties	  while	  promoting	  public	  goods	  such	  as	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  (Trebilcock	  et	  al.,	  1979;	  Barton,	  2001;	  Woolley,	  2012	  ).	  If	  status	  quo	  North	  American	  lawyer	  regulation	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accomplishes	  these	  goals	  more	  effectively	  than	  the	  alternatives,	  then	  some	  sacrifice	  in	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  might	  be	  acceptable.	  	  Moreover,	  North	  American	  lawyer	  regulators	  are	  dedicated	  to	  the	  "core	  values"	  of	  lawyer	  professionalism	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  bar.	  	  Universal	  licensure	  and	  the	  insulation	  of	  lawyers	  from	  non-­‐lawyers	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  necessary	  corollaries	  of	  these	  core	  values	  (Turriff,	  2010;	  Semple,	  2013).	  
Does	  regulating	  lawyers	  require	  a	  Hobbesian	  choice	  between	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  quality	  assurance	  and	  core	  values	  on	  the	  other?	  	  Or,	  can	  North	  American	  legal	  services	  regulation	  be	  reformed	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  renders	  justice	  more	  accessible	  while	  safeguarding	  these	  more	  traditional	  goals?	  	  	  These	  questions	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  article.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  profession	  and	  its	  regulators	  must	  clearly	  understand,	  and	  mitigate	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent	  possible,	  the	  negative	  ramifications	  of	  lawyer	  regulation	  for	  the	  accessibility	  of	  justice.	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